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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the role of initiating party in estimating takeover 
performance. We show that there are significant differences in bid-premiums and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) depending on deal initiator. All else being 
equal, targets tend to receive higher premiums and demonstrate higher CARs 
when takeovers are initiated by acquirers. Adverse selection risk theory was used 
to explain such variation. By using a sample of 3316 publicly announced 
corporate takeovers in the US, we also show that exposure to adverse selection 
risk is moderated by industry concentration level and merger type. The 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index was used to measure industry concentration and 
showed positive and statistically significant effect on CARs in the manufacturing 
industry, yet other concentration measures in other industries did not show these 
effects. Furthermore, drawing on our model we found that the level of information 
asymmetry was relatively higher in conglomerate mergers which, once again, 
witnessed the important role of initiating party in estimating takeover 
performance. 
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Introduction: Motivation and Purpose of Study 
 
This thesis is about corporate takeovers1. The very term of “corporate takeover” 
implies an action performed by the one who is “taking over”, i.e. the buyer. The 
use of this term in previous literature also witnesses an underlying assumption that 
takeover deals are, first and foremost, initiated by the bidders. However, most 
recent publications (see, for example, Simsir (2008) and Xie (2010)) distinguished 
between the actual transaction flow and deal initiation, and questioned an 
overestimated buyer’s perspective in M&A research that considers an acquirer as 
decision maker of importance. In fact, researchers have shown that in many cases 
the sellers are actively pursuing a takeover (Simsir 2008; Anilowski Cain, Macias, 
and Sanchez 2010). 
 
Questions surrounding deal initiation mark a relatively new area of research that 
point to one common conclusion: cumulative abnormal returns and bid premiums 
are higher in bidder-initiated deals than target-initiated deals (Simsir 2008; Xie 
2010). Since these conclusions were made on small data samples, it triggered us 
to investigate whether the initiating party hypothesis holds in large samples and 
search for better explanation of deal initiation phenomenon in economic theory. In 
previous studies various theories were used to explain this variation, such as 
liquidity (Officer 2007), bargaining power (Xie 2010) and adverse selection risk 
(Simsir 2008) theories. Following Simsir (2008), we take a deeper look into 
adverse selection risk theory, arguing that variation in target wealth effects can be 
explained by different degrees of information asymmetry across bidder-initiated 
and target-initiated deals. This brings us to the second research question which we 
aim to investigate – i.e. how market structure and merger type moderate a causal 
relationship between the initiating party and target wealth effects in corporate 
takeovers.  We assume that different market concentration levels and merger types 
(conglomerates versus non-conglomerates) inherent different degrees of 
asymmetric information between merger deal participants and, consequently, 
drive variation in market reaction towards merger announcement. 
 
                                                 
1 We consider a corporate takeover as any type of transaction leading to purchase of one company 
(the target) by another (the acquirer) regardless of whether it is a tender offer or a solicit 
agreement. Related to that, we use the terms of ‘mergers and acquisitions’ (M&A), ‘takeovers’ and 
‘transaction deals’ interchangeably. 
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Our findings show that, on average, target shareholders earn 3.4 percentage points 
higher cumulative abnormal return around the day of announcement and a 6.6 
percentage points higher four week bid premium when the transaction is initiated 
by the bidder. When using a merger type as a proxy of information asymmetry, 
we observe that, on average, targets earn  a 14 percentage point higher four week 
bid premium in bidder-initiated conglomerate deals than in target-initiated 
conglomerate deals. Furthermore, our study finds support for moderating effects 
of industry concentration and sets the ground to investigate these effects further. 
More specifically, due to data limitations, we used the Herfindahl–Hirschman 
index as a proxy of industry concentration in a subsample of transactions where 
target firms operated in manufacturing industry. Other concentration measures in 
other industries did not show similar effects and, therefore, could be further 
investigated. Overall, our study results support the initial hypotheses about deal 
initiation effects and moderating effects of information asymmetry, and give 
credit to adverse selection risk theory when explaining variation in target wealth 
effects in bidder-initiated and target-initiated takeovers. 
 
Although our study builds heavily on Simsir’s (2008) work, it also differs from it 
in several ways and contributes to better understanding of deal initiation in 
corporate takeovers. First, we test our deal initiation hypothesis on, to our best 
knowledge, the largest data sample that has ever been used in similar analyses. 
Second, we proxy different magnitudes of information asymmetry by using 
industry concentration and merger type dummies, and examine whether and how 
they moderate the effects of initiating party on target wealth in corporate 
takeovers. 
 
The remaining of this study is organized as follows:  first, we review current 
literature on deal initiation and information asymmetry and justify the use of our 
information asymmetry proxies in current theory. Based on our literature review, 
we develop two sets of hypotheses and discuss them in the second part of the 
thesis. Further, we describe how the initial data sample was collected and what 
additional actions it took to build a final data set and test our hypotheses. In the 
forth part, we explain the methodology used and comment on our findings. 
Finally, we provide the conclusions and recommendations for further research. 
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Background and Literature Review 
 
Since the late seventies the academic literature within the field of corporate 
takeovers has mostly been focusing on pre- and post-acquisition companies’ 
performance. They have measured cumulative abnormal returns, bid-premiums 
and wealth transfer, to name a few, as an outcome of such activity (Franks, 
Broyles, and Hecht 1977; Gaughan 2005, 131). By relying mostly on publicly 
available data, researchers have tested many hypotheses to explain the drivers 
behind variation in performance outcomes. However, only recently has this focus 
shifted to the private part of the takeover process which started to pull academia’s 
attention as it helped to explain better the many puzzling findings on pre- and 
post-acquisition performance2. Given a relatively recent quest for investigation of 
the initial (private) stages of the takeover process, the role of deal initiating party 
and its effect on merger outcomes remains underexplored and the underlying 
assumption of acquirer as initiator and decision-maker of importance is prevailing 
(Graebner and Eisenhardt 2004).   
 
We firstly review the literature that investigates interaction between initiating 
party and M&A deal outcomes. The aim of such a review is to increase our 
understanding about how deal initiation relates to wealth effects of target 
shareholders and learn major explanations of this interaction as suggested by 
theory. Our thorough examination of the literature shows that adverse selection 
hypothesis and information asymmetry argument stand among the most 
commonly used explanations of variation in merger outcomes. Therefore, as a 
next step in our literature review, we concentrate on studies that investigate the 
role of information asymmetry in takeover deals. This gives us a deeper 
knowledge and understanding about how asymmetric information relates to 
transaction outcomes. Since our intended contribution is to show moderating 
effects of information asymmetry on relationship between deal initiation and 
                                                 
2 Nihat Aktas and Eric De Bodt (2011) broke down the takeover process into private and public 
parts. The private component starts with initiation of contacts among possible merger parties and 
lasts until the merger announcement. The second component starts with public announcement and 
lasts until it is consummated, see Kiymaz, Halil, and H. Kent Baker. 2011. The art of capital 
restructuring : creating shareholder value through mergers and acquisitions, The Robert W. Kolb 
series in finance. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley., p. 261-279. 
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target wealth effects, we present studies supporting our view that industry 
concentration and merger type are relevant measures of information asymmetry. 
Deal initiation – emerging variable 
The research attention on pre-public stage of the takeover process started to grow 
rapidly after Boone and Mulherin published their paper in 2007 (Boone and 
Mulherin 2007). The main discovery of this publication was an opening of 
Pandora’s Box in the pre-public takeover process, showing how much of the 
action was, in fact, taking place before the takeover was publicly announced. The 
paper also contradicted previously drawn conclusions on competition in takeover 
markets, stating that it was more competitive than the evidence from the public 
part of the takeover process has revealed. Boone and Mulherin (2007) also 
concluded that wealth effects to target shareholders are similar from auctions and 
single-bidder negotiations and suggested further exploring and giving better 
explanations of dispersed target wealth effects. Our thesis is also built on this 
quest as we use deal initiation as explanatory variable of target wealth effects in 
corporate takeovers. Following this line of thought, in the following sections we 
provide a critical review of a number of studies that examined the role of deal 
initiation in takeovers.  
 
Among the first ones, Anilowski Cain, Macias, and Sanchez (2010) challenged 
recent inference about comparable wealth effects resulting from different sales 
methods (Boone and Mulherin 2007). Anilowski et al (2010) argue that the 
analysis of the method of sale and wealth effects used to draw such conclusions is 
a case of self-selection bias. Their underlying assumption is that the private 
information possessed by target company managers and adverse selection risk 
together with uncertainty of future cash flows are among the main drivers 
affecting the choice of the selling method. The authors found that the probability 
of choosing an auction was increasing when targets took the deal initiative. 
Furthermore, researchers used initiating party as a proxy for adverse selection risk 
and came to the conclusion that returns to target shareholders in an auction were 
higher if the transaction was not initiated by the seller. These study results imply 
that in seller-initiated deals targets are more likely to expect lower returns because 
of the asymmetric information that they hold. 
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Another publication that is also worth of attention was written by Aktas, de Bodt, 
and Roll (2010). The authors use the initiation variable to proxy target’s 
willingness to sell which, in turn, shows a signal to the acquirer. Such a signal 
gives acquirer a hint to its bidding strategy considerations and elevates its 
bargaining power. Researchers conclude that target’s eagerness to sell reduces 
premiums in negotiation deals since bidders are likely to anticipate the costs that 
targets are facing when choosing an auction. In addition, Aktas et al (2010) argue 
that due to the target’s temptation to stimulate competition and increase bids they 
tend to choose auctions as a method of sale in their initiated deals. Although these 
authors explain return differences by anticipated auction cost and bargaining 
power arguments we believe they are also subject (or product) of asymmetric 
information that the sellers are holding. High willingness to reduce negative 
effects of information asymmetry might explain why sellers strive for a more 
competitive environment in takeover bids.  The latter point is in line with the 
arguments of Povel and Singh (2006) who suggested that targets should exploit 
information asymmetry by increasing competition among bidders if exclusive 
negotiations with only one bidder fail. Hansen (2001) also emphasizes that a seller 
may prefer an auction in order to employ a rational excuse in retaining sensitive 
information from potential rivals, suppliers and/or customers, thereby creating 
adverse selection effects. These findings witness that target-initiated deals involve 
a larger portion of asymmetric information and take the auction form which helps 
to offset the negative effects of information asymmetry on target returns. This 
insight is consistent with what Boone and Mulherin (2007) reported about non-
significant effects of different selling methods on takeover results. 
 
In contrast to some previously mentioned studies, Xie (2010) ran his analysis 
primarily on deal initiation by taking into account the selling method. He reported 
supportive evidence on comparable target returns which was originally presented 
by Boone and Mulherin (2007). Xie (2010) used 598 observations, covered the 
period of 2000 – 2004 and reduced a threshold for deal value up to 10$ million 
(Boone and Mulherin used a threshold of 100$ million). Xie (2010) documented 
that the majority (i.e. 84.8%) of target-initiated deals were done by employing the 
auction method. After comparing returns with the ones in negotiated mergers the 
author found no significant difference. Yet, when regressing returns on deal 
initiation Xie reported 8.2% higher excess returns to target shareholders when the 
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deal was initiated by acquirer. He explained this discrepancy by arguing that when 
targets initiated transactions it weakened their bargaining power positions, and 
thereby reduced chances to receive a greater premium. Such a discount was also 
explained by the liquidity hypothesis. Officer (2007) discussed this in the context 
of unlisted target acquisitions and showed that discounts were even greater when 
information asymmetry was present.  
 
Oler and Smith (2008) carried a different type of analysis. They investigated 400 
companies that were publicly announced and were willing to be taken over 
(labeled as TMO)3. Although their sample represented only ‘one side of the coin’ 
(i.e. target-initiated deals) and does not include targets that sold themselves within 
pre-public takeover stage, their study findings are worth of mentioning. It appears 
that in a longer run, the market, on average, perceives TMO announcements as a 
bad news signal that triggers a drop in stock prices despite a short lasting positive 
reaction. This research is in line with what other scholars have concluded about 
the importance of deal initiating party in estimating target returns.   
 
Notwithstanding various explanations of why targets suffer from self-initiation 
discounts, it seems that the role of information content and perceptions of it have 
been underestimated. We could intuitively guess that the bargaining power 
asymmetry, as such, is unlikely to affect the market reaction. Similarly, liquidity 
search is more likely to act as a trigger that could later result into action 
surrounded with asymmetric information. Last but not the least, questions about 
whether initiating party effects on target returns can be moderated by any other 
variable remain not answered. 
 
One of the most recent working papers by De Bodt, Cousin, and Demidova De 
Bruyne (2011) has touched upon this issue. Researchers argued that target’s 
willingness to sell (WTS) is unobservable, and therefore a latent variable was 
created. By using a process research methodology, they observed and labeled 
targets with low, medium and high WTS and found support for all their 
hypotheses. More specifically, De Bodt et al (2011) concluded that: (1) WTS has 
a negative effect on bid-premium, 2) increase in WTS fuel the probability of deal 
                                                 
3 „Take-me-over“- TMO (Oler and Smith 2008) 
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to be completed, and 3) a WTS-driven negative effect could be reduced by 
stimulating competition among bidders. The latter point also implies that lower 
willingness to sell on behalf of the target may signify higher target resistance and, 
thereby, force bidders to bid more aggressively.  
 
What was important about De Bodt et al (2011) paper was that it inspired us to 
think of and explore other potential moderating variables, in particular, the level 
of information asymmetry. Simsir (2008) gave us more confidence in using the 
adverse selection risk argument to explain variation in target returns. With a 
sample of 947 observations over the period of 1997-2006 Simsir (2008) 
documented similar results as did Xie (2010) and De Bodt et al (2011) and 
brought us to conclusion that variation in target returns across bidder-initiated and 
target-initiated transactions is likely to exist because of unequally informed deal 
participants. In order to understand better how asymmetric information creates 
adverse selection risk4 and, in turn, determines the M&A outcomes we will 
continue exploring these issues in the following section.  
Information asymmetry – explanatory factor 
Following the widely used “lemon’s”5 framework, Simsir (2008) argues that in 
the presence of information asymmetry the signals that merger parties produce by 
taking the first initiative create adverse selection risk, thereby, inducing suspicion 
about the hidden information among deal participants. This, in turn, leads to 
bidding discounts (premiums). To ground his hypothesis better, Simsir (2008) also 
uses argumentation provided by Myers and Majluf (1984) who discussed the 
pecking order theory under investment decision procedure. Simsir (2008) draws a 
parallel between the investment decision procedure and target’s decision to sell, 
and argues that companies that put themselves on the counter desk tend to be 
treated as “lemons”. 
 
Yook, Gangopadhyay, and McCabe (1999) argue that information asymmetry 
exists in the takeover market and it influences a choice of payment method. Their 
main research interest is on a different information asymmetry set, however. The 
                                                 
4 Adverse selection risk arises from information asymmetry and in this context will be used 
interchangeably. 
5 Akerlof, George A. 1970. "The Market for "lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3): 488-500. 
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authors found strong relationship between insiders’ trading (used as proxy of 
information asymmetry) and decision on the method of payment on behalf of the 
acquiring firm. They documented that bidders using stock-offerings had higher 
insider trading than bidders using cash-offerings. A market reaction to bidders 
featuring more insiders’ trading was reported to be more severe. Similarly, the 
acquiring firm’s perspective was used by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2007). Although different proxies for information asymmetry were used in this 
study, the authors reported higher acquirer’s announcement returns for users of 
cash-offerings when information asymmetry was high. The latter could be 
explained by the fact that stock markets usually perceive companies using cash-
offerings more favorably than stock-offering users since idiosyncratic volatility 
(used as a proxy of information asymmetry) of the latter is high (Moeller et al 
2007). 
 
Following this line of thought, a proxy of divergence of investors’ opinion (on 
potential targets) was built in the study of Chatterjee, John, and Yan (2012) where 
researchers examined a relationship between total takeover premium and 
divergence of investor’s opinion. Chatterjee et al (2012) found that the higher 
opinion divergence on the potential target was, the lower the probability of it to 
become acquired was. At the same time, the authors reported that the higher the 
divergence of opinions was, the greater the total takeover returns were. One of the 
potential explanations of these rather puzzling findings might be attributed to the 
fact that Chatterjee et al (2012) did not control for deal initiation in their model.  
 
A novel measure of information asymmetry was developed by Cheng, Li, and 
Tong (2008). The authors constructed the index consisting of financial analyst 
coverage, forecast errors and dispersion, and bid-ask spread. Although these 
scholars interpret a bid price differently from a bid-premium, CAR measures are 
also investigated. Their study results echo previously reviewed articles that 
emphasize an important explanatory role of information asymmetry in estimating 
takeover outcomes. One of their suggested explanations is that the merger 
announcement forces market to re-evaluate more opaque targets assuming that 
acquirer has an information advantage over the market.  However, this paper does 
not take deal initiation into account which, consequently, lifts information 
asymmetry consideration at a firm/market level, and not at the firm/firm level.  
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From the literature review provided above, we observe that researchers emphasize 
an important explanatory role of information asymmetry in estimating M&A 
outcomes. With the aim to capture different degrees of adverse selection effects, 
they use a variety of proxies. We draw our research on the quest given by Halpern 
(1982) who defined the need to do additional research on concentration ratios and 
merger types in corporate takeover studies. A critical review of the literature that 
associates information asymmetry with different levels of industry concentration 
and merger types is given in the following section. 
Market concentration, type of merger and information asymmetry 
Since late 1980s researchers have shown their attempts to draw a line between 
concentration and information asymmetry at a firm level of analysis. For example, 
Chiang R. and Venkatesh (1988) used a proxy of concentration of insider holdings 
to measure the level of information asymmetry faced by the dealers. Their 
underlying assumption was that a company with higher concentration in 
ownership structure and higher insiders’ ownership hold larger proportion of 
shares that could be traded among informed traders and, consequently, leave 
dealers with higher information costs. Chiang R. and Venkatesh (1988) found that 
higher concentration led to a wider bid-ask spread among the dealers. Researchers 
also discussed a small-firm anomaly in that respect. They argued that a small-firm 
tends to have a smaller number of insiders, and consequently, retains more inside 
information which poses greater adverse selection risk to the dealers. Similarly, in 
the analysis of Malaysian manufacturing industry Ei Yet and Saw Imm (2010) 
documented that insiders with more than 41 per cent of holdings cause high 
information asymmetry in a low competitive market.  
 
The above mentioned statements about the informed trading at the firm level of 
analysis makes us assume and test whether the same hypothesis holds at the 
industry level. Following this line of thought, our assumption is that firms in 
markets of high concentration are more likely to involve in the informed 
transactions among themselves as there are relatively fewer uninformed 
participants when compared with dispersed ones in markets of low concentration.   
Another, albeit not direct, link between market concentration and information 
asymmetry could be drawn from the study of Kewei and Robinson (2006). The 
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researchers studied the relationship between industry concentration and average 
stock returns and found that in more concentrated markets the average stock 
returns were lower comparing to more competitive industries. One of the 
explanations that these authors made was that different risk magnitudes command 
for different stock returns. Drawing on Kewei and Robinson (2006), we assume 
that information asymmetry accounts for the total risk that is perceived by the 
market which we expect to be relatively lower in more concentrated industries. In 
other words, we assume that in more concentrated markets the adverse selection 
risk which is triggered by asymmetric information between merger participants is 
less severe. The common value auction approach supports our view. Researchers 
argue that a greater concentration, or “allocation”, of information among bidders 
leads to more precise valuation, yet it reduces competition which forces bidding 
prices to go down (Mares and Shor 2006). When keeping the competition factor 
constant, high market concentration leads to more precise valuation as it reduces a 
magnitude of adverse selection risk among bidders which, in turn, moderates the 
effect of deal initiating party on target returns (ibid).  
 
Beyond market concentration, different merger types could also signify different 
levels of information asymmetry and, therefore, could moderate a relationship 
between initiating party and takeover outcomes.  To start with, mergers are often 
categorized as ‘horizontal’, ‘vertical’ and ‘conglomerate’ mergers (Gaughan 2011, 
13-14). Mergers between competitors in the same market are referred to as 
horizontal mergers, whereas vertical mergers are the ones where companies had 
buyer-seller relationships previously before the deal was initiated. The prior 
buyer-seller relationships make us assume that the companies know each others’ 
products, processes and routines rather well, despite the fact that entering new 
business areas might sometimes reveal unanticipated clashes with new 
competitors at different supply chain levels. A high degree of inter-competition 
inherent in horizontal mergers may also signify good information allocation 
among rivals, albeit incidents of non-perfect (e.g. noisy, delayed) signals may be 
reported. Following the information allocation argument, we treat horizontal and 
vertical mergers more alike than different and, thus, define them as a non-
conglomerate group of mergers in the remaining parts of the thesis.  
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In contrast to horizontal and vertical mergers, conglomerates are mergers where 
companies are neither competitors nor alliance parties through buyer-seller 
relationships but operate in unrelated industries. The biggest incentives to execute 
such deals are business diversification goals and pursue of the above-average 
returns. However, studies show that executing such deals is challenging because 
of higher market entry barriers and high probability of mistakes due to lack of 
knowledge and high information costs about the relevant industry. Moreover, 
there is an evidence showing that poorly performing companies find themselves 
more frequently in the midst of diversification strategy  (Gaughan 2011, 153). 
 
After running a cross-sectional regression on mergers over the period of 1950-
2006 Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) questioned a long-lasting paradigm of 
diversification-discount as they did not report lower combined (acquirer plus 
target) returns in conglomerate mergers, when compared to non-conglomerate 
mergers. To explain such a result, they used internal capital market hypothesis 
which lost its support after external capital markets became more developed in 
late 1980s. Consequently, in their sample of transactions that were concluded after 
the 1980’s Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) found less positive returns in 
diversification mergers that could be explained by agency cost hypothesis and the 
shift in market attitude towards conglomerates. Since Akbulut and Matsusaka 
(2010) did not look at the target CARs exclusively, we cannot draw any 
conclusions in terms of market reaction towards the targets. However, a change in 
market attitude towards conglomerates gives us a good incentive to investigate 
market reaction against the targets solely in our recent data sample. 
 
The ‘synergy’ perspective seems to be very relevant in understanding the role of 
different types of mergers in corporate takeovers. It is well known that a number 
of synergies could be derived from mergers, such as cost-reduction and revenue 
enhancing, tax-based, debt-capacity, internalization, etc. Horizontal mergers, 
according to Gaughan (2005), have highest potential for such synergistic effects 
as companies operating in the same market tend to realize synergies easier 
because of better understanding of the industry they operate in. We would expect 
the same tendencies to appear in vertical mergers due to relatively low 
information asymmetry costs. Interestingly, empirical evidence suggests that 
returns to seller shareholders are larger in conglomerate mergers than in non-
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conglomerates (Gaughan 2005). However, after controlling for a method of 
payment in such analyses, a merger type losses its explanatory power, and cash 
payments appear to be responsible for these higher returns (Lane and Yang 1983). 
In turn, it remains unclear whether a type of merger matters in estimating target 
wealth returns. Drawing on this limitation in prior research, we argue that the 
price a buyer considers paying for a target consists of two major components – 
equity’s market value (1) and potential synergy benefit (2) – that are both subject 
to negative information asymmetry effects. While asymmetric information in 
estimating a “real” equity value can be shaved away by executing “heavy” due 
diligence, the assessment of potential synergy benefits requires a deep knowledge 
of the target firm and the industry in which it operates (Halpern 1982). Due to 
relatively low information asymmetry costs in vertical and horizontal mergers, we 
expect that this competence is mastered more effectively in non-conglomerate 
mergers. 
 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) paper supports our view. In their investigation of 
European mergers, researchers document significant differences in choices of 
payment methods across different types of mergers. Their analysis suggests that 
bidders tend to use cash payment more often in related industries (horizontal and 
vertical mergers) than in unrelated (conglomerate) mergers. Given that stock-
offerings feature contingent-pricing characteristics (Hansen 1987), our assumption 
that these offerings are preferred in cases of higher asymmetric information seems 
to be plausible. It is also in line with Eckbo (2007) who names information 
asymmetry as one of the key determinants of payment choices. The above-given 
findings and explanations allow us to state that non-conglomerate mergers are 
more likely to incorporate less asymmetric information.  
 
To conclude, researchers reported conclusive evidence that deal initiation matters 
in M&A deals and affects their outcomes. It seems there is a common agreement 
among scholars that target wealth effects are higher in bidder-initiated deals than 
in target-initiated deals. The adverse selection risk theory and, more specifically, 
the information asymmetry argument have been used to explain such variation. 
Prior research also made us believe that deal partners may be unequally exposed 
to adverse selection risk under different levels of market concentration and in 
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deals of different merger types. In order to test these relationships, we develop 
two sets of hypotheses and explain them in more detail in the following section. 
 
Hypotheses  
 
The main goal of this study is to test whether and how deal initiation matters in 
takeover markets, i.e. whether and how it affects bid-premiums and cumulative 
abnormal returns to target shareholders. In this manner, our investigation draws 
heavily on Simsir (2008) work and aims to reaffirm his findings on a bigger 
sample that also involves “clean” initiation dummy variables. Following Simsir 
(2008), we raise our first set of hypotheses as follows: 
 
H0: There is no difference between wealth effects to target shareholders 
depending on who initiates the deal, buyer or seller. 
H1: There is a difference in wealth effects to target shareholders 
depending on who initiates the deal, buyer or seller. 
 
Differently from Simsir (2008) but similar to De Bodt, Cousin, and Demidova De 
Bruyne (2011) we assume that the effect of initiating party on takeover outcomes 
is moderated by different degrees of information asymmetry. Drawing on our 
literature review, we hypothesize that the magnitude of adverse selection risk (a 
result of information asymmetry) is different under different market concentration 
levels and across different merger types. Consequently, we assume that market 
concentration and merger type alter the slope of initiation variable effect. To test 
our hypotheses, we introduce two interaction terms, respectively: 1) an interaction 
term between market concentration and initiation variable, and 2) an interaction 
term between a merger type (conglomerate versus non-conglomerate) and 
initiation. As a result, our second set of hypotheses is as follows: 
 
H0: There is no significant effect of interaction term on wealth effects to 
target shareholders (β3 = 0) 
H1: There is a significant effect of interaction term on wealth effects to 
target shareholders (β3 ≠ 0) 
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Our interaction term presents either the level of market concentration or a merger 
type, and we run these regressions separately. Thus, a second set of our 
hypotheses involves testing of four different regressions. Two separate regressions 
will be run for bid-premiums and cumulative abnormal returns, including 
initiation on the market concentration variable. The other two will incorporate a 
merger type as the interaction term, instead. 
 
Data and methods 
Sample and data collection 
Our data sample derives from two different sources. The main dataset was 
provided to us by our supervisor Øyvind Norli whom, together with Eckbo and 
Thorburn, has compiled the data. In order to examine interaction effects of deal 
initiation, merger type and market concentration on target premiums, we have 
extended the sample with data from the US Census Bureau.  
 
Eckbo, Norli & Thorburn dataset 
The sample consists of 3316 publicly announced US corporate transactions over 
the period of 5.6.1996 – 12.31.2009 and collected from Thompson SDC`s Merger 
and Acquisition database. The data set was constructed using the following 
criteria: 
- Deal Code: M (Merger) or AM (Acquisition of majority interests) 
- Merger status: reported 
- Deal: completed or withdrawn 
 
In order to classify the initiating party, the SEC-EDGAR6 database was used to 
search for SEC filings by target and the bidder in a 12 month window after the 
announcement date of the transaction. SEC filings of forms, such as DEFM14A 
(definitive proxy statement for M&A), PREM14A (preliminary proxy statement 
for M&A), schedule TO-T (third party tender offer), 14D9 (management tender 
offer recommendation) were studied in order to explore the background of the 
merger, and in particular to determine the initiating party. The authors were 
                                                 
6 All US companies that are required to file statements with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission do this electronically in the SEC-EDGAR database. 
 Master Thesis – GRA 19003  03.09.2012  
Page 15 
particularly concerned with identifying the parties that took the initial approach or 
even the strategic action that led to a merger. The less complicated story is when a 
target firm A directly approaches a firm B with the intention to negotiate a merger 
deal that consequently leads to a merger AB. However, most of the transactions 
are of a more complicated nature. A merger is categorized as the target-initiated 
deal when it is initiated by the target board or a target shareholder activist. We 
create a dummy variable deal initiation taking the value of ‘1’ if it is a bidder-
initiated deal and ‘0’ if it is otherwise. 
 
To obtain financial data and merger-associated ratios concerning the targets, they 
were combined with target information from CRSP and Compustat. From the data 
set we use the following abnormal return (AR)7 variables in our regressions: 
cumulative abnormal return to the target 3 days around the merger announcement 
(CAR3) and bid premiums calculated using the stock price 4 weeks and 1 day 
before the announcement (Premium4w and Premium1d).  In addition, we add the 
variable Runup which is the target CAR in the window of (-40, +1) to capture 
potential increase in the target stock price due to information leakage to the public 
about the forthcoming merger. 
 
Extended dataset: industry concentration and merger type 
Drawing on our literature review and developed hypotheses, we have extended the 
Eckbo, Norli and Thorburn dataset with two variables: 1) Industry Concentration, 
and 2) Merger Type. 
Industry Concentration 
This variable was extracted from the US Census Bureau`s (UCB)8 Economic 
Census Survey. The available years for the survey were 1997, 2002 and 2007. The 
mining and construction industries were not reported by UCB. Consequently, 
observations where the target was from one of these industries were not sampled. 
                                                 
7 The abnormal return is defined as excess return above the expected return calculated using the 
market model (Brooks, Chris. 2008a. Introductory econometrics for finance. 2nd ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.). 
8 US Census Bureau is an underlying entity of the US department of commerce. They provide 
national surveys within economics and other areas. The database is accessible at 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml 
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Possible implications of this are discussed in the final part of the thesis where we 
comment on the robustness of our findings.      
 
Market concentration measures reported were the ratio of turnover to the total 
industry for the 4, 8, 20 and 50 largest firms. As for the manufacturing industry, 
the report also gave the Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI) which indicated the 
market shares of the 50 largest firms in a respective industry. 
 
It is worth of mentioning that in 1997 the US industry classification system 
changed from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS). This change has also been implemented 
in UCB surveys which meant that market concentration measures were reported in 
the new system. Given that the Eckbo Norli and Thorburn dataset provided the 
SIC codes only, we have manually converted between the classification systems. 
However, there was no direct way of converting between the systems since the old 
and new codes did not match one another. A solution to this could have been a 
UCB published concordance table which created a mapping between the old and 
new system. However, as criticized by Beekman (1992)9, concordance 
coefficients do not constitute a real continuation of time series but only 
approximations and, therefore, should be treated with caution. In order to keep the 
quality and comparability of the time series, we used a set of selection rules. We 
did not match SIC codes with NAICS codes where one SIC (NAICS) code linked 
to more than one NAICS (SIC) code. Neither did we match codes where the link 
could not be fully explained by USB. We used market concentration ratios 
reported on the 3 digit NAICS codes. Higher digit levels (e.g. 6 digits) 
significantly reduced the total sample as they were more often in conflict with the 
selection rules.  
 
Industry concentration ratios were reported differently in the manufacturing 
industry compared to other industries. We took this point into account when 
creating the variables: Conc4 reports the concentration ratio for the 4 largest firms 
in the industry subsectors (3 digit NAICS), except manufacturing; Manuf_va4 
reports the concentration ratio for the manufacturing subsectors measured by 
                                                 
9 In UCB Issue Paper NO.5 The Impact of Classification Revisions on Time Series  
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value added. Manuf_pos4 is equal to the latter but measures concentration by 
percentage of shipments. Furthermore, we created the same variables for each 
measure of concentration, i.e. 8, 20 and 50 firm. These variables are introduced in 
the methodology part where we conduct several robustness checks.  HHI_va and 
HHI_pos reports the HHI for subsectors in the manufacturing industry.  
 
In constructing these variables we effectively reduced the total sample size from 
2413 to 1652 in the first case, and had 973 observations in the manufacturing 
sample. 
 
Since the survey was not undertaken annually we used 1997 ratios for the 
transactions between 1996 and 2001, while 2002 was matched with 2002 – 2006 
and 2007 ratios were used for 2007 – 2009. In total, we matched 2413 transactions 
with measures of industry concentration. The remaining 903 of the full sample 
were in violation of selection rules or did not have a match. A detailed description 
of the data screening can be viewed below, in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
Merger types 
We coded takeover transactions as either non-conglomerate (horizontal or 
vertical) or conglomerate deals. Although we treated horizontal and vertical 
transactions as non-conglomerate mergers, we still distinguished between the two. 
We did this in order to use the ‘horizontal merger’ variable as a control variable in 
our regressions, capturing the effect of asset relatedness. Since merger types were 
not reported in our data, we used proxies to determine them. Mergers were treated 
as horizontal in cases when the merging firms shared the same 4 digit SIC codes. 
Vertical mergers had 4 different digit SIC codes but were from the same industry 
Concentration Measure All t_conc t_manuf t_HHI
Initial Sample N 3316 2343 973 973
Excluded because of 
selection rules N
381 280 101 101
Not reported N 522 411 111 111
Matched observations N 2413 1652 761 761
1996-2009
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group (2 digit SIC). We determined conglomerate deals when the merging firms 
were from different industry groups. To separate those different merger types, we 
used dummy variables. Horizontal marked horizontal mergers with the value of 
‘1’ and we coded ‘0’ if it was otherwise. The variables Vertical and 
Conglomerate were coded, respectively. As footherwiser the merger type, a full 
sample was kept and all transactions were coded. Overall, there were 1340 (41%) 
vertical, 1032 (31%) horizontal and 944 (28%) conglomerate transactions in our 
data sample. 
Data descriptive 
The size of our sample and a number of variables that we use calls for an in-depth 
analysis of sample distribution. In the following section we present what we deem 
to be the most interesting findings in descriptive statistics. 
 
As shown in Figure 1 (see below), our sample is somewhat different from the one 
of Simsir (2008). He reports that buyer-initiated deals outweigh target-initiated 
deals in most of the years covering his sample. Our sample shows that 52% of the 
mergers are target-initiated deals. However, this number is not consistent over the 
years. The years of 1998 and 1999, two most active years for the mergers in our 
sample, show that 60% of the transactions were initiated by targets. Data from 
2001 and 2006 show that 54% and 56% of deals are bidder-initiated mergers, 
while the remaining years display no large differences. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Table 2 (see below) shows the total number of transactions in each year split 
between target- and bidder-initiated deals. We compare the means for each group  
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Table 2-Mean differences in CAR 3 days year by year 1996-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Year  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
                 
Full Sample N 146 292 355 396 329 253 149 206 198 217 275 258 130 112 3316 
Target Initiated N 76 145 208 232 152 138 75 102 98 113 121 145 70 60 1735 
Acquirer Initated N 70 147 147 164 177 115 74 104 100 104 154 113 60 52 1581 
                 
Mean Target CAR in acquirer 
initated deals 
% 15,4 % 15,0 % 18,1 % 14,9 % 18,0 % 22,9 % 22,8 % 19,7 % 17,4 % 18,3 % 18,4 % 18,9 % 28,3 % 29,2 % 18,9 % 
                 
Mean Target CAR in target initated 
deals 
% 14,0 % 8,8 % 14,7 % 16,1 % 18,5 % 18,7 % 20,0 % 15,2 % 12,8 % 10,3 % 15,7 % 16,4 % 29,8 % 20,1 % 15,8 % 
                 
Difference in means A-I 1,4 % 6,1%*** 3,3%* -1,2 % -0,5 % 4,2%* 2,8 % 4,4%* 4,6%** 7,9%*** 2,6%* 2,5 % -1,5 % 9,1%** 3,0*** 
                 
t-value  0,54 2,96 1,58 -0,59 -0,21 1,37 0,73 1,58 2,08 3,62 1,44 1,22 -0,26 1,76 4,26 
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of initiators and test the one-sided hypothesis that the 3 day CAR means in bidder- 
initiated deals are higher than those of the target-initiated deals. Our findings 
show that the differences in means are positive in 11 out of 14 years covering our 
sample, and 8 of them being significantly different from zero. Years of 1999 and 
2000 leading up until the recession in 2001 and ending with the turbulence around 
9/11 show a negative but insignificant difference in CAR means. The same is true 
for 2008 which is the period around the subprime mortgage crisis. What is more 
interesting is the fact that the highest positive differences in means were in years 
following financial turmoil. There might be many plausible explanations of this 
observed pattern. One of those might be attributed to the target returns that are 
affected by volatility differences in the sample period (Simsir, 2008). A more 
detailed discussion about how we controlled for that potential effect is introduced 
in the methodology section of this thesis.  
 
In Table 3 (see below) we compare firm, deal and financial characteristics for 
targets as well as for bidders in different merger types. By introducing different 
types of the merger we show that targets tend to take initiative more often in 
conglomerate and vertical mergers, yet there is no such difference in horizontal 
deals. Among all types we observe that the size of the average bidder is 4 times 
the one of the target. We also observe that the number of completed non-
conglomerate deals is higher than conglomerate deals (80% of the conglomerate 
deals are completed while in vertical and horizontal mergers this number reaches 
90%.) Targets that initiate conglomerate deals are higher book to market firms 
than targets that take initiative in horizontal and vertical deals. There is no specific 
difference in leverage between the groups (an average leverage is about 22%). 
 
Table 3 
    Conglomerate     Horizontal          Vertical 
Variable 
 
Target 
Initiated  
Bidder 
Initiated 
Target 
Initiated  
Bidder 
Initiated 
Target 
Initiated  
Bidder 
Initiated 
  
525 419 515 517 695 645 
Completed N 426 340 468 471 630 590 
Percentage of 
stock Mean % 19 % 22 % 44 % 48 % 47 % 42 % 
Relative size Mean% 31 % 21 % 29 % 29 % 24 % 23 % 
Book to market Mean 90 % 75 % 73 % 66 % 68 % 65 % 
Leverage   21 % 19 % 22 % 19 % 25 % 21 % 
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Statistical Model 
In line with the conventional thought in statistical handbooks (Brooks 2008b; 
Wooldridge 2009), we use a cross-sectional event study methodology to measure 
wealth effects to target shareholders in the period around the announcement of a 
corporate takeover. This method will enable us capturing the impact of the 
announcement on returns, depending on deal initiation and the relevant set of 
control variables.      
 
The section consists of three parts. First, we develop and explain a statistical 
model used to test our first hypothesis whether the gap between target- and 
bidder-initiated deals are different from zero. If we are to reject the null 
hypothesis, our results are consistent with the findings of Simsir (2008). Secondly, 
we introduce the variables of concentration and merger type to test moderating 
effects of deal initiation on returns to target shareholders. Last but not the least, 
we present a number of variables that we use to control for other known effects on 
target returns in the setting of corporate takeover announcements. 
 
We run a cross-sectional regression model which was first developed by Simsir 
(2008) by applying a standard OLS procedure. This allows us to test the 
hypothesis that there is a significant difference in wealth effects (WE) to the target 
depending on who initiates the deal, buyer or seller. We measure WE using three 
different dependent variables: 1) Car3, 2) Premium1d and 3) Premium4w. The 
first variable measures the cumulative abnormal return to target shareholders 3 
days around the announcement (-1, +1). The second and third variable measures 
target wealth effects by comparing the difference between the stock prices 1 day 
and 4 weeks prior to the announcement with the price offered by the acquirer. 
 
(1)  WEi = αo + β1*Initiationi + βn*Controlsn +εi 
 
Our econometric model regress WE on the deal initiation variable and the relevant 
set of controls. In this case, deal initiation is a dummy variable with the value of 
‘1’ if it is a bidder-initiated deal and ‘0’ if it is otherwise. Given the significance 
of β1, an interpretation is that the average WE to the target differs when the 
transaction is initiated by the bidder. Holding all other variables equal to zero, the 
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intercept measures WE in the base case where the transaction is initiated by the 
target. 
 
As we have seen from the literature review, many scholars agree that variation in 
target wealth effects in bidder- and target-initiated deals exist and could be 
explained by the information asymmetry argument. We hypothesize that a merger 
type and market concentration proxy for different levels of information 
asymmetry that, in turn, moderate the effects of deal initiation on target wealth. 
To measure these moderating effects, Wooldridge (2009) suggests adding 
interaction terms. Following that, we specify two econometric models: the first 
taking into account a merger type, and the second one – market concentration. We 
distinguish between conglomerate and non-conglomerate transactions where 
horizontal and vertical mergers collapse into the category of the latter (see, 
Equation (2) below). As mentioned above in the data section, we created two 
different samples of market concentration data and, therefore, run the regressions 
on both samples (see, Equation (3) below) generating in total 6 regressions for the 
model.  
 
(2) WEi = αo + β1 Initiationi + β2Conglomoratei + β3(Initi*Congli)+βnControlsn + εi 
  
(3) WEi = αo + β1Initiationi + β2Concentration + β3(Initi*Conci) + βnControlsn + εi 
 
Our interpretation of the two equations differs, to some extent. Equation (2) 
involves interaction terms between the two dummy variables that allow us to 
estimate the percentage point difference in wealth effects across all four groups: 
 
 Bidder-initiated conglomerate transactions  
 Bidder-initiated non-conglomerate transactions  
 Target-initiated conglomerate transactions 
 Target-initiated non-conglomerate transactions 
Equation (3) allows us to test whether there is a significant difference in target 
WE across different levels of market concentration in the target industry. By 
holding the variation in WE in bidder- and target-initiated deals constant, we 
would expect the WE to converge as market concentration level increases.  
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We also add a set of control variables in our model in order not to omit the effects 
of other potential explanatory variables. We select control variables and respective 
measures from Simsir (2008) and De Bodt et al’s (2011) studies, in particular, 
deal completion (‘1’ if completed, ‘0’ if otherwise), percentage of cash, log of 
relative sizes, R&D, enterprise value, book to market, asset relatedness and 
capital expenditures. In addition, we control for the volatility of the stock market 
in the transaction period. This is proxied by using the S&P 500 Volatility Index 
(VIX) which is an implied market expectation of the movement on the index the 
next 30 days.10  
 
RESULTS 
Target Wealth Effects of Deal Initiation 
In our first econometric model we tested the null hypothesis implying no 
significant difference in wealth effects to target shareholders irrespective of who 
initiated the deal – the buyer or the seller. However, as shown in Table 4 (see 
below), deal initiation has a significant effect on target returns at .01 level. With 
this, we reject the null hypothesis and firmly state that the targets earn, on 
average, more when the takeover deal is initiated by the bidders. A short-term 
investor (-1 day) earns 3.4 percentage points more by buying the stock before the 
announcement and selling it after, while a long-term investor (-4 weeks) gains an 
offer premium of 6.6 percentage points compared to the cost price of the stock.  
  
                                                 
10 The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX ) is a key measure of market expectations of near-term 
volatility conveyed by S&P stock index option prices- Chicago Board Options Exchange  
http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/vixintro.aspx 
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Table 4 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient CAR3 Premium 1d Premium 4w 
Sample Full sample Full sample Full sample 
    
C 0,0272 0,1433 0,1570 
    
Deal initiation 0,0347*** 0,0644*** 0,0665*** 
 (5,4852) (3,7951) (2,778) 
Percentage of stock -0,000*** -0,000 -0,000 
 (4,454) (-0,792) -0,308 
Deal Completed 0,0444*** -0,073** -0,038 
 (4,4889) (-2,772) (-1,017) 
Asset relatedness -0,002 0,0104 0,0099 
 (-0,316) (0.5668) (0,3802) 
Book to market 0,0088*** 0,0180** 0,0256** 
 (3,0905) (2,3461) (2,3577) 
Capex 0,0263 -0,135 -0,359* 
 (0,5930) (-1,138) (-2,139) 
Enterprise value 0,00001 -0,000 -0,000 
 (0,9529) (-1,914)* (-2,228)** 
Leverage 0,0861*** 0,0249 -0,024 
 (6,5092) (0,7021) (-0,490) 
Log of the relative sizes -0,047*** -0,049** -0,054 
 (-5,399) (-2,091) (-1,634) 
R&D 0,1802*** 0,3434*** 0,2789*** 
 (7,2587) (5,1598) (2,9719) 
Runup -0,066***   
 (-4,958)   
Volatility(VIX) 0,0026*** 0,0086 0,0107 
 5,9965 7,4106 6,4963 
 R-Squared  0,0560 0,0236 0,0166 
    
Note. This table displays model 1 (presented in the data and methods section) where we regress deal initiation (‘1’ 
is bidder- initiated and ‘0’ is target-initiated deal) on target cumulative abnormal return 3 days around the merger, 
and the premium for a shareholder buying the stock 1 day and 4 week before the offer price is announced. Other 
variables are used to control for known effects on target return around the announcement day. In line with Simsir 
(2008), we do not incorporate Run-up in the regressions, including premiums, since they are partly overlapping. t-
values are reported  in parentheses, and * denotes significance at .1 level, **at .05 level, and *** at .01 level. 
 
 
Our control variables also provide us with some important information: first, they 
confirm the relevance of our chosen controls, and secondly, they prompt us to 
think about particularities of our sample if the results contradict findings from 
previous studies. More specifically, we notice that returns are decreasing with 
increased use of stock as a method of payment. The coefficient, although small in 
magnitude, on stock payments is negative and significant in the first regression 
(see, Table 4). However, the sign is changing across the regressions, and the stock 
payment method becomes no longer significant in explaining the bid premiums. 
Moreover, deal completion and target leverage is significant at .01 level in 
explaining CARs (4.4%, t= 4.4 and 8.6%, t=6.5). Interestingly, directionality of 
those effects change when moving across the regressions (2) and (3) and 
estimating the bid premiums. The relative difference in size between targets and 
bidders has a negative and significant effect on short-term returns and premiums. 
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Our reported volatility index signifies that target wealth effects are on average 
higher in more volatile stock market periods. Overall, our empirical evidence 
confirms findings of other scholars(e.g. Simsir (2008), Xie (2010), Anilowski 
Cain, Macias, and Sanchez (2010)) about the important role of initiating party 
when estimating target wealth effects in takeover markets. 
 
In the following two sections we present the results of our second model 
(Equations (2) and (3)) where we show moderating effects of a merger type and 
market concentration on the relationship between deal initiation and target wealth 
returns.  
Interaction Effect of Merger Type and Deal Initiation 
Drawing on our assumption that conglomerate mergers posit higher information 
asymmetry costs when compared with non-conglomerates, we tested a null 
hypothesis implying that a merger type has no moderating effect on relationship 
between deal initiation and target wealth. Statistically speaking, when 
incorporating the interaction term initiation*conglomerate into our regression 
model, we expected deal initiation to have positive and significant effects on 
target returns, irrespective of what type of merger was announced.  
 
As we can see in Table 5 (see below), the effect of deal initiation remains positive 
and significant in our new model and confirms our initial hypothesis that initiating 
party matters in estimating wealth to target shareholders.  
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Table 5  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient CAR3 Premium 1d Premium 4w 
Sample Full sample Full sample Full sample 
    C 0,0362 0,1623 0,1868 
    
Deal initiation 0,0296*** 0,0603*** 0,0471* 
 
(3,9672) (3,0124) (1,6538) 
Conglomerate Merger -0,0199** -0,0341 -0,0613* 
 
(-2,0452) (-1,3042) (-1,6469) 
Initiation*Conglomerate 0,0162 0,0062 0,093* 
 
(1,1596) (0,16532) (1,7377) 
Deal Completed 0,0424*** -0,0785*** -0,0351 
 
(4,2655) (-2,9432) (-0,9269) 
Percentage of stock -0,0003*** -0,0002 -0,0002 
 
(-4,7735) (-1,1182) (-0,2284) 
Book to market 0,0091*** 0,0174** 0,0324*** 
 
(3,1944) (2,2704) (2,9659) 
Capex 0,0328 -0,1241 -0,3008* 
 
(0,7368) (-1,0389) (-1,7712) 
Enterprise value 0,000015 0,00008* 0,000015** 
 
(0,9271) (-1,843) (-2,5063) 
Leverage 0,0853*** 0,0169 -0,0003 
 
(6,4449) (0,4773) (-0,0078) 
Log of the relative sizes -0,0489*** -0,0466** -0,0796** 
 
(-5,5148) (-1,9677) (-2,3632) 
R&D 0,1807*** 0,3443*** 0,285*** 
 
(7,281) (5,1722) (3,0102) 
Runup -0,0667*** 
  
 
(-5,0121) 
  
Volatility(VIX)  0,0025*** 0,0086*** 0,0107*** 
 
(5,9093) (7,3545) (6,4161) 
        
R-Squared 0.0749 0.0371 0.0282 
    
This table displays Model 2 (presented in the data and methods section) where we regress deal initiation 
(‘1’ is bidder- initiated and ‘0’ is target-initiated deal) on target cumulative abnormal return 3 days around 
the merger, and the premium for a shareholder buying the stock 1 day and 4 week before the offer price is 
announced. We also add an interaction term Initiation*Conglomerate (where conglomerate is a dummy 
taking the value of ‘1’ when it is a conglomerate merger and ‘0’ when it is otherwise) in order to capture a 
moderating effect of conglomerate merger on relationship between deal initiation and target returns. Other 
variables are used to control for known effects on target return around the announcement day. In line with 
Simsir (2008), we do not incorporate Run-up in the regressions including premiums, since they are partly 
overlapping. t-values are reported in parentheses, and * denotes significance at .1  level, ** at .05 level and 
*** at .01 level. 
 
As shown in Table 5, the coefficient on the 4-week bid premium reduces from 
6.6% to 4.7% in magnitude and its significance diminishes from .01 level to .1 
level. A direct effect of a conglomerate type of the merger on target returns is 
negative and significant (except for 1-day bid premiums), supporting a theory that 
conglomerates are trading at a discount (Lang and Stulz 1994).  We also report 
that the interaction effect of deal initiation and conglomerate merger is non-
significant in all our models, except for the 4-week bid premium model. In the 
latter (see, Model (3) in Table 5), the coefficient is positive and high as 9.3% 
(t=1.7) and significant at .1 level. These results are somewhat conflicting and let 
us conclude that the null hypothesis cannot be completely rejected. Overall, an 
interpretation of this is that the variation in target returns still remains, and its 
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magnitude is levered when we add our proxy for information asymmetry. More 
precisely, we observe (holding control variables constant) that targets, on average, 
earn 6.1311 percentage points more in target-initiated non-conglomerate deals than 
in target-initiated conglomerate deals. This difference increases from 4.71 to 
10.84 percentage points when bidders take the initiative in non-conglomerate 
deals. Target returns increase with another 3.17 percentage points in bidder-
initiated conglomerate deals. 
 
We observe that conglomerate mergers have two opposing effects. On the one 
hand, they result in negative premiums in the form of a discount. On the other 
hand, our results show that in bidder-initiated conglomerate mergers the overall 
target wealth effect is positive. Intuitively, we believe that the negative effect 
associated with conglomerate mergers is outweighed by the fact that bidders tend 
to bid higher in these mergers. One possible explanation could be information 
asymmetry between bidders and targets which is likely to be high due to less 
transparency and knowledge of unrelated businesses. Another plausible 
explanation could be that conglomerate acquirers have higher bargaining power 
than non-conglomerate ones when the targets take initiatives because targets have 
no distinct assets to complement other than the pure diversification effect.  
Interaction Effect of Deal Initiation and Industry Concentration 
A third question that we investigate in this thesis is whether and how the level of 
target industry concentration moderates the effect of deal initiating party and 
target returns. We believe that the relevant information is easier to access the 
higher the level of industry concentration is. This leads us to believe that the gap 
in target returns decreases across target- and bidder-initiated deals with an 
increase of industry concentration. Holding the average discrepancy between 
target returns in target- and bidder-initiated deals constant, we test the null 
hypothesis implying that there is no significant difference in the linear slopes 
estimated by our regression models. We expect a positive effect of deal initiation 
and a negative effect of the interaction term. As mentioned in the data and 
methods section of this thesis, we run our regressions on two samples - a full 
sample with a 4-firm concentration measure and a sub-sample of manufacturing 
                                                 
11 The differences between groups are calculated holding the control variables constant and 
inserting the respective values of the dummy parameters for each group into the regression 
equation. 
 Master Thesis – GRA 19003  03.09.2012  
Page 28 
firms with the Herfindal-Hirschman Index). The results with full sample are 
presented in Table 6, and results from the subsample are reported in Table 7. 
Table 6 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient CAR3 Premium 1d Premium 4w 
Sample 1652 1652 1652 
    
C 0,0360 0,1640 0,1512 
    
Deal initiation 0,0369*** 0,0552*** 0,0779*** 
 (4,6531) (2,5885) (2,5677) 
Industry concentration -0,0010*** -0,0023** 0,0014 
 (-2,5939) (-2,1343) (0,9166) 
Initiation* Concentration -0,0003 0,0008 -0,0003 
 (-0,6134) (0,5339) (-0,1703) 
Deal Completed 0,0454*** -0,0721*** -0,0338 
 
Asset Relatedness 
 
(4,6061) 
0,00007 
(0,0110) 
(-2,7205) 
0,0146 
(0,4288) 
(-0,8966) 
0,0066 
(0,2514) 
Percentage of stock -0,0003*** -0,0001 -0,0000 
 (-4,3159) (-0,7115) (-0,1001) 
Book to market 0,0086*** 0,0165** 0,0319*** 
 (3,0302) (2,1464) (2,9212) 
Capex 0,0010 -0,1792 -0,2917* 
 (0,0231) (-1,4923) (-1,7067) 
Enterprise value 0,0000 -0,0000* -0,0000** 
 (1,0913) (-1,7319) (-2,5493) 
Leverage 0,0918*** 0,0282 -0,0041 
 (6,9213) (0,7948) (-0,0813) 
Log of the relative sizes -0,0475*** -0,0428* -0,0797** 
 (-5,3826) (-1,8140) (-2,3708) 
R&D 0,1654*** 0,3213*** 0,2952*** 
 (6,6142) (4,7817) 3,0873 
Runup -0,0680***   
 (-5,1108)   
 Volatility(VIX)  0,0025*** 0,0086*** 0,0108*** 
 (5,9185) (7,3750) (6,4873) 
    
R-Squared 0,0774 0,0347 0,0240 
    
This table displays Model 3 (presented in the data and methods section) where we regress deal initiation  (‘1’ is bidder- 
initiated and ‘0’ is target-initiated deal) on target cumulative abnormal return 3 days around the merger, and the premium 
for a shareholder buying the stock 1 day and 4 week before the offering price is announced. We also add an interaction 
term Initiation*Concentration (4 firms ratio) in order to capture interaction effects of industry concentration and deal 
initiation. Other variables are used to control for known effects on target returns around the announcement day. In line 
with Simsir (2008), we do not incorporate Run-up in the regressions, including premiums, since they are partly 
overlapping. t-values are reported in parentheses, and * denotes significance at .1  level, ** at .05 level and *** at .01 
level. Note that we exclude manufacturing industry from this regression analysis as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used 
as a concentration ratio therein.  
 
 
The test results from Table 6 show, in line with our results in Tables 4 & 5, that 
deal initiation measured on a standalone basis is significant in all regressions. The 
single variable industry concentration is negative and significant in explaining 
target wealth effects in the short run (regressions (1) and (2)). More explicitly, a 
10% increase in target industry concentration is followed by a decrease in target 
returns with 1%, independent of who initiates the transaction. The interaction term 
initiation*concentration is negative but insignificant at all sig. levels. Hence, 
statistically, we find no support in our data and, therefore, are not able to reject the 
null hypothesis. 
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There might be many explanations for our reported non-significant relationships. 
One of those might relate to the fact that the sample suffers from selection bias 
since not all industries are included, e.g. mining and construction industries are 
not represented in the UCB reports. In addition, the manufacturing industry is also 
omitted from this sample as industry concentration level therein is reported using 
the HHI. Generally speaking, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a more widely used 
(and possibly a better) measure of industry concentration, yet it is largely absent 
in our dataset.  Following this thought, we perform the same test for the 
subsample of manufacturing industry (see, Table 7 below). 
Table 7 
 (1) (3) (4) 
Coefficient CAR3 Premium 1d Premium 4w 
Sample 761 761 761 
    
C 0.0220 0.1410 0.1620 
    
Deal initiation 0.0392*** 0.0598*** 0.0711*** 
 (5.771 (3.270 (2.734 
Industry concentration(HHI) 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001 
 (2.722) (0.853) (0.693) 
Initiation* Concentration(HHI) -0,00014** 0.00004 0.00001 
 (-2.136) (0,224) (0,040) 
Deal Completed 0,0436*** -0,073*** -0,033 
 
Asset Relatedness 
 
(4.416) 
-0,0018 
(-0,2707) 
(-2.771) 
0,0105 
(0,5724) 
(-0,877) 
0,0089 
(0,3410) 
Percentage of stock -0,0003*** -0,0001 0,00001** 
 (-4.300) (-0,699) (0,0403) 
Book to market 0,0086*** 0,0168** 0,0318** 
 (3.019) (2.191) (2.906) 
Capex 0,0246 -0,141 -0,316* 
 (0,554) (-1.185) (-1.864) 
Enterprise value 0,0000 -0,0000* -0,0000** 
 (0,962) (-1.811) (-2.502) 
Leverage 0,0874*** 0,0192 -0,000 
 (6.607) (0.542) (-0,000) 
Log of the relative sizes -0,048*** -0,045* -0,081** 
 (-5.484) (-1.942) (-2.406) 
R&D 0,1703*** 0,3288*** 0,2629*** 
 (6.798) (4.884) (2.744) 
Runup -0,065***   
 (-4.933)   
 Volatility(VIX)  0,0026*** 0,0086*** 0,0107*** 
 (5.952) (7.356) (6.426) 
    
R-Squared 0,0744 0,0374 0,0277 
    
This table displays Model 3 (presented in the data and methods section) where we regress deal initiation (‘1’ is 
bidder- initiated and ‘0’ is target-initiated deal) on target cumulative abnormal returns 3 days around the merger, 
and the premium for a shareholder buying the stock 1 day and 4 week before the offering price is announced. We 
also add an interaction term Initiation*Concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) in order to capture interaction 
effects of industry concentration and deal initiation. Other variables are used to control for known effects on target 
returns around the announcement day. In line with Simsir (2008), we do not incorporate Run-up in the regressions, 
including premiums, since they are partly overlapping. t-values are reported in parentheses, and * denotes 
significance at .1  level, ** at .05 level and *** at .01 level. 
    
The results that we got after running regressions on the manufacturing industry 
sample somewhat confirmed our suspicion that the full sample might have 
suffered from the selection bias. As Table 7 reports, there is no striking difference 
in deal initiation effects compared to the previous tests. Neither do the 
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significance nor do the signs of any of the control variables change radically. 
What is particularly interesting from this test is the fact that the effect of the 
interaction term deal initiation*concentration (HHI) is negative (-0,00014, t=-
2,136) and significant at .05 level when estimating cumulative abnormal returns of 
the targets. However, this interaction effect is not significant when estimating the 
bid premiums. Our findings on CARs suggest that the gap in abnormal returns 
between target-initiated and bidder-initiated deals is diminishing with 1.4% per 
100 point increase on the HHI. This partly supports our previous findings that the 
discount on target-initiated deals is decreasing with increased concentration in the 
target industry. There is no doubt that drawing conclusions from these results will 
be ambiguous since the sample is only containing observations from the 
manufacturing industry and, thereby, might capture some variation which is 
industry-specific. Nevertheless, we believe we should give credit to the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index in reporting a significant interaction effect of 
industry concentration and deal initiation, and we encourage researchers to use 
this measure of concentration further in larger samples.  
 
To summarize our hypothesis testing results, we observe that target firms, on 
average, earn more (both in the short- and long-term) when the deals are initiated 
by bidders. A short-term investor, on average, earns 3.4 percentage points more 
by buying the stock before the takeover announcement and by selling it after, 
while a long-term investor (-4 weeks) is presented with a bid premium of 6.6 
percentage points compared to the cost price of the stock. With this evidence we 
confirm findings of prior research (e.g. Simsir (2008), Xie (2010), Anilowski 
Cain, Macias, and Sanchez (2010) and De Bodt, Cousin, and Demidova De 
Bruyne (2011)).  Our contribution was an attempt to explain why and when (or 
under what conditions) this difference appears to be significant. By testing 
interaction effects of deal initiation, merger type (conglomerate vs. non-
conglomerate mergers) and industry concentration, we aimed to show variation in 
the level of information asymmetry that target and bidder firms face in takeover 
transactions. Our results show that targets earn significantly higher returns in 
bidder-initiated conglomerate deals and the earnings’ gap across target-and 
bidder-initiated deals decreases with increasing concentration in the target 
industry. Since the latter finding is based on a small sample of manufacturing 
firms, we encourage future research to verify it in large samples.  
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Robustness Check 
In order to check the robustness of our findings we included a dummy variable for 
each year and industry in each of the three econometric equations. By including 
them into our set of controls and after running the regressions several times, we 
tested whether our findings were affected by industry- or yearly-specific 
characteristics. We found no evidence that this altered our results in any way.  
 
The 4-firm concentration ratio and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index were only the 
two measures of industry concentration used in this study.  In USB reports also 
use the 8, 20 and 50- firm concentration ratios. By substituting the 4-firm 
concentration ratios with these alternative measures and running the regressions, 
respectively, we controlled for possible selection bias. Other than what we have 
already discovered in the statistical analysis (e.g. that HHI gave different results in 
the manufacturing industry), we observed similar results when using the 
alternative measures.  
 
Our sample with concentration data might  also have suffered from selection bias. 
First, since UCB does not report concentration ratios for the construction and 
mining industries, these industries are not represented in our sample. Second, 
because of the official change from SIC to NAICS as industry codes, we were not 
able to match all transactions with concentration ratios. Because of this, we have 
nearly reduced our initial sample by 50% which is a limitation of our study. 
Whether sampling issues can explain non-significant findings on our reported 
interaction terms remains a question to answer for further research.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis we examined a causal relationship between initiating party and 
wealth effects to target shareholders in corporate takeovers. We built our study 
heavily on Simsir (2008) and Xie (2010) findings who reported that targets, on 
average, earn more in bidder-initiated deals than in target-initiated deals. The 
ultimate goal of this thesis was to explain the rationale behind this variation in 
target returns and give an account of when (or under what conditions) this 
variation appears to be significant. Drawing on adverse selection risk theory and 
information asymmetry argument, we used merger type and target industry 
concentration as proxies of information asymmetry and developed respective 
hypotheses.   
 
To test our hypotheses we used a sample of 3316 corporate transactions over the 
period of 1996 and 2009 that involved a data set from Norli, Thorburn and Eckbo 
and reports from the US Census Bureau. Our findings indicate that target 
shareholders, on average, earn a 3.4 percentage points higher cumulative 
abnormal returns around the day of announcement and a 6.6 percentage points 
higher 4-week bid premiums if transactions are initiated by bidders. When we 
adjusted the level of information asymmetry to the merger type, we observed that 
targets, on average, earned significantly higher 4-week bid premiums in bidder-
initiated conglomerate deals than in target-initiated conglomerate mergers. We 
concluded that a gap in bid premiums in bidder- and target-initiated deals is 
affected by the type of a merger. More specifically, we found that targets earn a 
significantly higher return in bidder-initiated conglomerate deals. Our explanation 
of this is that conglomerate deals inherent higher information asymmetry between 
targets and bidders and, therefore, those deals increase the adverse selection risk. 
The last but not the least, we partly confirm our hypothesis stating that in highly 
concentrated markets the discrepancy in target wealth effects is likely to be 
smaller. As we found support for this hypothesis in a small and industry-specific 
sample of takeover transactions, further investigation is needed and called for. 
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Introduction: Motivation and purpose of the Thesis 
 
As an area of research, Mergers and Acquisitions (hereinafter, M&As) is 
associated with empirics concerning data of publicly listed companies. Many 
hypotheses in M&A research focus on bidding strategies, premiums and 
organisational processes after the bid/sell initiation phase. Moreover, many 
researchers assume that M&A transactions are first and foremost initiated by the 
bidder.  
 The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether initiating party matters 
in M&A transactions, and if yes, how the initiator characteristics (buyer vs. seller, 
corporate governance mechanisms, family-owned vs. private firm) affect post-
take-over performance of the target. We plan to do our research on data from 
Norwegian private and family-owned firms. By analyzing Norwegian market of 
small and medium enterprises we intend to increase our understanding of unlisted 
firm behaviour and the market for private corporate takeovers. Our research 
questions are as follows:  
 
1. How do corporate governance factors in the target firm prior to take-
over transaction affect its post-takeover performance?  
2. How does initiating party moderate a relationship between corporate 
governance factors and post-takeover performance of the target firm? 
 
Why is this research interesting? Private and family-owned firms 
constitute a much higher contribution to GNP in Norway than publicly listed 
companies.  Furthermore; % (Grünfeld, Grimsby and Gulbran 2009, 28) reports 
that 39 500 (companies with >1Mnok in salary expenses) changes of ownership 
occurred between 2000 and 2007, whereof companies listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange accounts for only 0, 2%, thus leaving a large fraction of the transactions 
to a sample that has been neglected by previous studies. This is also supported by 
Berzins & Bøhren (2007) who found that in 2005 there were 500 non listed 
companies in Norway for each listed company of similar size. 
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Background and Literature Review 
 
In this section of the report we will first look at corporate governance 
factors that influence firm performance in a take-over context. Further, we will 
review a list of performance measurements that captures the impact preceding a 
take-over transaction best.  To do so, we consider a take-over transaction as any 
transaction leading to “purchase of one company (the target) by another (the 
acquirer, or bidder)” (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2012) and, therefore, use 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) interchangeably. IPOs are excluded as they are 
more related to raising capital for companies. Given that our contribution to 
existing literature falls into investigation of non-listed companies we also define 
them as private companies (e.g. AS, DA etc) 
 
Corporate governance  
It seems that LBO’s attracted significant researchers’ attention over the 
past decades due to increasing popularity in both sides of the pond, and also due 
to potentiality for market investors. “Private equity activity creates economic 
value on average (Kaplan, Stromberg 2008)”. As mentioned earlier, in typical 
LBO (private equity) transactions bidders are the ones that usually take initiative. 
Moreover, in such transactions there is a high debt leverage that creates pressure 
on managerial behaviour and, in turn, reduces agency costs (disciplining device). 
However, the effect varies across initiating parties (buyers vs. sellers) and in 
transactions of private vs. publicly listed companies. Overall, performance 
implications of CG mechanisms can not be generalized to all M&A transactions. 
Therefore, by analyzing similar CG devices across different research settings one 
might come up with different findings about performance implications. 
In this part our aim is to provide an overview of corporate governance 
mechanisms that have an impact on post-takeover performance of the firm, such 
as legal regime, ownership structure, financial structure and top management 
incentive packages. Since Norway has a specific Scandinavian civil-law regime 
and performance-related pay is rather seldom (Bøhren, Ø. and B. A. Ødegaard 
2006), we chose to omit these two mechanisms as they are more or less ‘prefixed’ 
in terms of variability of our sample. 
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One of the classical predictors of bad corporate governance is high level of 
free cash flow. It is argued that a split between ownership and control rights leads 
to agency costs in a guise of free cash flow which is under control of managers 
but not shareholders (Jensen 1986,  1993). This view is also supported by Robert 
D. Arnott and Clifford S. Asness (2003) who found that by using dividend policy 
as a proxy for FCF (free cash flow) that increase direct cash flow payout to 
owners is related with better company performance. Hence, FCF seems to play a 
major role in firm performance both before and after the takeover. Albeit direct 
cash payout is designed to reduce incentives of managers to waste FCF, it is not 
so obvious in private companies because discrepency between the owners and 
managers is not that high. Moreover, in family-owned companies this kind of 
discreprency is almost non-existent. 
Shareholder structure; There is no doubt that shareholders have a 
significant impact on how good a company performs. The rule of thumb is that 
shareholders’ concentration of 30-40%, measured by Herfindahl12 index, has a 
positive effect on firm performance: Tobin’s Q (Bøhren and Ødegaard 2006).  
Having a shareholders’ concentration below that threshold there is lack of 
monitoring incentives. On the other hand, a “free-rider’s” problem among small 
shareholders arises when having a high level of concentration and large owners 
are often found to expropriate welfare from the small owners. Similarly, a 
separation between CEO and a Chairman of the Board and ownership rights 
assigned to the management has positive effect on firm performance (Haleblian, et 
al. 2009). 
A company Board is another variable that influences firm performance. 
There is consensus among researchers that smaller boards improve firm 
performance (Jensen 1993). Several researchers also found the opposite effect 
arguing that bigger boards bring more expertise and better access to cheaper 
capital (Anderson, Ronald C., Mansi, Sattar and Reeb, David M. 2004). 
Therefore, we find it of even higher interest to examine a causal relationship 
between M&A initiatives (bidder vs. seller) and post-takeover performance in 
private companies of different board sizes. 
Although, as we can see above, there are already some common 
conclusions achieved by researchers, there is quite a little known under different 
                                                 
12 Herfindahl index – sum of squared fractions across all owners 
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context (firms environment) – mergers and acquisitions. Moreover we want to 
observe from a different angle – target’s perspective; violating presumption that 
bidder always takes initiative. For example, financial distress might trigger the 
initiative of the target on M&A, but its effect on post-M&A performance is 
ambiguous. Our preceding literature review also suggests that we should take a 
closer look at financial policy, shareholder concentration and companies’ boards 
as corporate governance mechanisms and examine whether these mechanisms 
have similar effects on post-takeover performance. Given many performance 
measurement methods and all criticism associated with that (Tuch and O’Sullivan 
2007) it is also essential to understand which of the measurements may capture 
post-takeover performance best. 
 
Post-Takeover performance assessment 
According to classical economic theory the ultimate goal of any 
shareholder is to maximize the value of their invested wealth. Consequently, it is 
not surprising that the performance of targets and bidders both pre- and post- 
acquisitions has been comprehensively explored by financial researchers.  
 Our motive for conducting this dive into the literature is two-sided; first, 
we seek a general understanding of the empirical evidence concerning takeover 
performance. Secondly, statistical models with the aim of measuring performance 
related to a single event are often criticized, as they frequently are associated with 
various methodological problems (Tuch and O’Sullivan 2007). Thus, it will be 
important to gain knowledge of potential fall pits before a model is constructed.  
 In their 2007 review article Tuch and O’Sullivan distinguish between short 
and long-term performance of the acquirer and between event studies focusing on 
share prices and accounting performance. Given that our study focuses on non 
listed companies we cannot rely on market share prices as they are unobservable. 
Despite the fact that accounting performance measures are under heavy criticism 
because of easy manipulation by managers we still consider them as the ones 
eventually revealing effects of transactions. Therefore we tend to use -24 and +24 
month window. Additional difficulty arises when it comes to comparison of two 
different time periods: pre-takeover and post-takeover because after transaction 
the form of the company might be changed.  
  So far we consider employment of operating margin, as they should reveal 
incentives for value creation in terms of profitability (Andrade, G., Mitchell, M.L. 
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and Stafford, E. 2001). Return on operating assets and equity are supposed to 
cover underlying incentives for increased efficiency. All of these measurements 
are observable and thus easy feasible. However, there is no general agreement on 
what measurements are the best to capture takeover effect as this research area is 
still developing (Christian Tuch and Noel O’Sullivan 2007)  hence, additional 
conduct of measurements candidates review is necessary. 
 
Relationship between corporate governance factors, initiating party and post-
takeover performance? 
Researchers have developed a set of theories explaining why takeovers 
happen and how they affect performance of the target and bidder firms. Following 
Weston and Halpern (1983), two sets of acquisition theories can be identified: 1) 
those that explain a non-value maximizing behaviour of the acquiring firms’ 
management, and 2) those that focus on value-maximizing motivations13. Jensen 
(1986) builds his agency cost argument on combination of these two theories. He 
states that takeovers occur due to agency problems (e.g. high FCF, weak owners, 
entrenched managers, etc.) and that takeovers or even a treat of potential takeover 
can be beneficial for target shareholders, especially when there are high agency 
problems therein and high cash holdings are present in the bidder. Others found 
that type of a bid (e.g. friendly vs. hostile takeover), method of payment (e.g. cash 
vs. stock), sales method (e.g. auction vs. negotiation) also count for differential 
effects on post-takeover performance (Andrade, G., Mitchell, M.L. and Stafford, 
E. 2001). Inspired by these research findings we argue that post-takeover 
performance of the target is a function of corporate governance mechanisms 
therein, and this causal relationship is moderated by initiation of the deal– be it by 
a bidder or a seller (Haleblian, et al. 2009)  
The issues surrounding takeovers have lead to a vast number of articles, 
books and other scientific publications. However, by searching in various 
databases we found a very limited number of articles that focus on deal initiation 
(Macias, Cain and Sanchez 2011). Macias, Cain and Sanchez (2011) argue that 
“initiation” is a proxy for adverse selection risk and which, among other variables 
(e.g. uncertainty of future cash flows), affects whether a target decides to sell its 
shares via an auction or negotiation. Researchers found that auctions are 
                                                 
13 All investments should have positive NPV 
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associated with higher target cumulative abnormal returns (hereinafter, CAR) and 
offer premiums than negotiations, but only if the transactions are not initiated by 
the target. The intuition here is that the adverse selection problem that occurs 
when a target puts itself up for sale reduces the price of the target, and that this 
reduction is not outweighed by the choice of selling through an auction. 
 We believe that these findings only tell part of the story concerning a 
takeover deal initiation. In particular, we argue that if all market participants are 
aware of the adverse selection problem, then there must be an explanation why 
target initiation occurs. Moreover, we will also measure the long-run post-
acquisition performance of the target depending on who took the initiation of the 
deal. 
  
  
 Master Thesis – GRA 19003  03.09.2012  
Page 8 
Hypotheses 
Our literature review showed how corporate governance mechanisms 
affect takeovers and how they are related to post-takeover performance. We 
identified several gaps in the literature. In particular, we argue that prior research 
is overly focused on a bidder as decision-maker of importance and fails to show 
initiation effects on target’s post-takeover performance thus our first hypothesis is 
intended to check whether high FCF, as one of weak CG guises, is replaced with 
better performance incentivised by acquirer:  
H1: High free cash-flow in the pre-takeover target firm has a positive 
effect on target’s post-takeover performance; 
Further, we assume that companies facing high leverage and foreseeing 
future difficulties to serve a debt is closer to financial distress and thus: 
H2: It is more likely that a target firm with high leverage initiate M&A 
transaction; 
Given initiating party is related with a transaction method (negotiations vs. 
auctions) we suspect: 
H3: There is a significant difference in post-takeover performance of the 
target firm depending on who initiates the deal – a bidder or a target; 
 We expect companies demonstrating very high growth rates and 
employing strong corporate governance mechanisms serving as fiduciary duties 
warranty to initiate M&A transactions as the way to enhance owners’ welfare: 
H4: A target firm with high growth and strong corporate governance 
mechanisms is more likely to initiate the M&A deal. 
 
Target CG 
factors 
Target 
Performance 
Initiative: 
Bidder/Target 
H3 
H2, H4 
H1 
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Methodology 
Sample 
Our data sample has been collected in two stages. First, we collected a set 
comprised of 166 takeovers in the period of 2001-2012, which is obtained from an 
external database in collaboration with BI Oslo. The data set consists primarily of 
Norwegian company data. However, some of the transactions will include a target 
or a bidder registered abroad. Each observation in the sample contains the 
following information; 
1. Initiation: Information about which of the parties took initiative in the 
transaction (a target or a bidder)  
2. Company id: Pre-merger organizational number of both firms. 
3. Other takeover characteristics: Auction/Negotiation and Price 
As mentioned in our literature review, researchers who used “Initiation” as a 
variable in their models had to make proxies based on either SEC fillings or 
interpretation of other available information. In our sample the initiator is the one 
(a buyer or a seller) that first approaches the intermediary (external source) in 
order to “sell or buy”. Hence, by definition this provides us with the unbiased 
variable. Secondly, we will use organizational numbers from the external sample 
to create a query in the BI CCGR14 database in order to match our observations 
with various corporate governance and performance variables. 
Data collection and analysis 
The hypotheses we have posed earlier in the paper will cover two aspects 
of takeovers. First, we will explore corporate governance characteristics of target 
firms and examine how these characteristics contribute to the probability of 
initiating a transaction. Secondly, we will measure the post-takeover performance 
of companies depending on who took the initiative. Thus, the different 
hypothesises will require a different set of statistical procedure that fits the 
properties of the dependent and independent variables. 
For example in H3 and H4 our objective is to measure the probability of 
the target initiating a takeover deal depending on the pre-takeover characteristics 
of the firm. Hence, initiation will be a dependent variable in the model. In this 
case a dependent variable is binary (dummy variable) taking the value ‘1’ if the 
target took initiative and ‘0’ if it did not. In that respect, Gujarati and Porter 
                                                 
14 BI Norwegian Business School Center for Corporate Governance Research Database 
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(2009:299) recommend using Probit or Logit models instead of the standard OLS 
estimation technique.  
 On the other hand, when we will estimate the effect of takeover initiative 
on post-takeover performance acquired performance measurement method will be 
an event study. Following related academic studies, we will use control variables 
in order to isolate the effects of the event. 
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